1 INTRODUCTION

Actuality Entailments (AEs) are inferences from premises that appear to be modal, like (1a), but their content is that the modality is effectuated in the evaluation world – (1b).

(1) a. Pierre a dû prendre le train
   Pierre had.to.PFV take the train
   ‘Pierre had to take the train’

b. *Inference*: Pierre took the train

AEs are surprising; if we assume that modals attribute their propositional argument to potentially non-actual worlds, something must be special to AE-licensers that leads to the inference of actuality.

Whatever that special feature is, its effect is complex, and it interacts in nontrivial ways with other phenomena of theoretical interest. In this paper I expand on these points by focusing on three generalizations. They are **AE-MODALITY**, **ANTI-AE**, and **NO-FC**:

(i) **AE-MODALITY**:
   An AE-licenser preserves the modality associated with its non-AE-licensing counterpart.
   (In notation that will be introduced shortly, $\Box/\Diamond p \models \Box/\Diamond p$)

(ii) **ANTI-AE**:
   A negated AE-licenser gives rise to what we will call an anti-AE, that is, an inference that the relevant possibility/obligation was not realized.
   ($\neg\Box/\Diamond p \models \neg p$)

(iii) **NO-FC**:
   An AE-licenser does not generate Free Choice inferences (FC) when its prejacent is disjunctive, in contrast to its non-AE-licensing counterparts, which do.
   ($\Box/\Diamond (p \lor q) \not\models \Diamond p \& \Diamond q$)

A correct theory of AEs must predict **AE-MODALITY** and **ANTI-AE** simultaneously. I will talk more about the difficulty of this desideratum when I review some of the existing accounts.
of AE-licensing. The third generalization, no-FC, will inform a different discussion, one pertaining not to theories of AE-licensing, but to theories of FC disjunction. Here I look at two broad views. The first derives FC as a scalar implicature (SI, e.g. Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002, Fox 2007); the second as a product of the semantic composition of modality with disjunction (e.g. Simons 2005, Aloni 2007). The central question is whether the two views can predict no-FC. For SI-theories the answer will depend crucially on anti-AE, given the essential role of negation (or negation-like inferences) in implicature generation. I will claim that no-FC is predicted on theories of this kind, given anti-AE, provided that certain auxiliary assumptions are put in place. I will also claim that AE-modality leads us to expect FC, incorrectly, if we adopt a view that generates the inference from the literal meanings of disjunction and modality. Nevertheless, I will present a stipulative way of getting around the problem, and leave it to future work to develop a more principled solution.

The discussion is organized as follows. In Section 2 I introduce AEs and demonstrate AE-modality, anti-AE, and no-FC. In Section 3 I discuss the challenges that AE-modality and anti-AE jointly present, using four (very briefly described) accounts of AEs as examples. In Section 4 I discuss the relevance of the two findings to no-FC, first from the perspective of SI-theories of FC, then from the perspective of semantic accounts of the inference.

2 ACTUALITY ENTAILMENTS

2.1 Background

The first report of Actuality Entailments came in Bhatt 1999, who noticed that in Hindi (among several other languages) perfective-marked ability modals imply that the ability was realized, while imperfective-marked ability modals do not (perfective and imperfective marking is abbreviated as pfV/imp).¹ This asymmetry is shown below in Hindi (2) and Greek (3): pfV-ability (but not imp-ability) is intuitively contradicted by subsequent denial of actuality.

(2) a. Iti vimaan ur.aa sak-aa (#lekin us-ne vimaan nahɨ ur.aa-yaa)
   Iti airplane fly able-pfv (but he-erg air-ship neg fly-pfv)
   ‘Iti could fly the airplane, but he didn’t fly the airplane.’

(3) a. Boresa na tu miliso (#ala ðen tu milisa)
   able.past.pfV.1sg na him talk-pfV.1sg but neg him talk.pst-pfV
   ‘I could talk to him, but I didn’t’

On a simple semantic proposal within the Kratzerian tradition², these data present a challenge; one may reasonably analyze verbs of ability similarly to other root modals,

¹ Though see von Wright 1963.
namely as operators that make quantificational claims over sets of accessible possible worlds. In the case of ability the accessibility relation may be ‘circumstantial’: to say that John is able to fly is to say that the given laws of nature, combined with what is assumed about John’s properties, do not rule out the possibility of him flying. But if quantification over hypothetical worlds underlies the meaning of ability, why does PFV-marking generate the inference of actuality?

The AE-paradigm became more complex when Hacquard (2006, 2009) and Borgonovo & Cummins (2007) noted that AEs are not limited to verbs of ability, but appear to be licensed by root modals of varying flavors and quantificational force. Below I show examples from French, and also from Brazilian Portuguese (BP) where both the existential modal **poder**, and the universal modal **ter que**, are unambiguously deontic.³

(4) Jane (#a pu)/(✓ pouvait) aller chez sa tante (selon les ordres de son père), mais n’ya pas allée.
   ‘Per her father’s orders, Jane could go to her aunt’s house, but didn’t’

(5) Pour aller à Londres, Jane (#a dû)/(✓ devait) prendre le train, mais elle a pris l’avion
   ‘To go to London, Jane had to take the train, but she took the plane’

(6) Ele (#pôde)/(✓ podia) visitar seu amigo, mas ele não o visitou
   ‘He was allowed to visit his friend, but he didn’t’

(7) Ele (#teve)/(✓ tinha) que ir no dentista, mas ele não foi
   ‘He had to go to the dentist but he didn’t’

(4-7) show the same pattern observed by Bhatt, but with existential and universal deontic modals. So whatever the correct analysis of AEs turns out to be, it cannot be specific to modals of ability.

Let me now pause to explain the notation I will use in the rest of this paper. I will write \(\Diamond/\Box\) when I want to refer to modals that license AEs, and the familiar \(\Diamond/\Box\) when I want to refer to modals that do not. That is:

(8) a. \(\Diamond/\Box p \vdash p\)
   b. \(\Diamond/\Box p \nvdash p\)

The examples seen so far suggest that the symbol pairs \(\Diamond/\Box\) and \(\Diamond/\Box\) correspond roughly to PFV- and IMP-marked modals, but this is not a perfect match, as we will see later. Let me

³ The BP judgements vary: some speakers do not agree that PFV-marked **poder/ter que** license AEs. This, however, is not the main concern of the paper. We are interested in the connection between AEs, anti-AEs, and FC. As far as I can see, speakers who agree with the AE-judgements also agree with the anti-AE judgements (shown in section 2.3), and agree that FC inferences are absent (section 2.4); speakers who disagree on AEs seem to simultaneously disagree with the anti-AE/FC judgements. The judgements reported here are from speakers of a rural dialect of BP, spoken in the Brazilian state of Paraná.
add that $\Diamond / \Box$ will also be used to write metalinguistic modal conditions. The symbols will be disambiguated where necessary.

The next three subsections provide evidence for AE-MODALITY, ANTI-AE, and NO-FC. The properties are summarized using our current notation in (i’-iii’) — note that $\Diamond / \Box$ represent metalinguistic modal truth conditions here.

(i’) **AE-MODALITY:** $\Diamond / \Box p \models \Diamond / \Box p$

(ii’) **ANTI-AE:** $\neg \Diamond / \Box p \models \neg p$

(iii’) **NO-FC:** $\Diamond / \Box (p \lor q) \nmodels \Diamond / \Box p \& \Diamond / \Box q$

### 2.2 AE-MODALITY: The modal inferences of AE-licensers

It is tempting at first glance to conclude from (8a) that AE-licensers simply assert the content of their prejacent; they otherwise say nothing about permission, obligation, etc. But there is evidence that this is not the case. For brevity I will offer only one kind of example to show this, and point interested readers to Hacquard 2009, Section 4.2, for further discussion.

Consider (9-10).

(9) a. Il a pu prendre le train, (✓ mais il aurait aussi pu ne pas le prendre).

He can.PFV take the train but he have.cond.PAST also can NE NEG it take

“He could take the train, but he could have also not taken it”

b. Il a dû prendre le train, (#mais il aurait aussi pu ne pas le prendre).

He must.PFV take the train but he have.cond.PAST also can NE NEG it take

“He had to take the train, but he could have also not taken it”

(10) a. Ele pôde viajar, (✓ mas tambêm podia não ter viajado).

He can.PFV travel ( but also can.IMP NEG have traveled)

“He could travel, but could have also not travelled”

b. Ele teve que viajar, (#mas tambêm podia não ter viajado).

He had.to.PFV travel ( but also can.IMP NEG have traveled)

The (a) examples in (9-10) are of the form $\Diamond p \& \Diamond \neg p$, and they are both intuitively consistent; the (b) examples are of the form $\Box p \& \Box \neg p$, and they are intuitively inconsistent. This contrast is expected if $\Diamond / \Box$ generated existential/universal modal inferences of their own, and would not be expected if they did not. Moreover, the fact that in BP the expressions pôde and teve que are unambiguously deontic, in parallel to the non-AE-licensers podia and tinha que, demonstrates that AE-licensers make reference in their semantics to a specific modal flavor. This too would be unexpected on a semantics based solely on the evaluation world.

We conclude that AE-licensers give rise to modal inferences in addition to the AE.5

(11) $\Diamond / \Box p \models \Diamond / \Box p$ (AE-MODALITY)

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4 Judgements due to Guillaume Thomas (p.c.).

5 Bhatt (1999), building on Thalberg 1969, claimed that PFV-ability does not contribute any claim about ability. I do not review Bhatt’s argument here. For details, see his section 5.3 and Hacquard section 4.2.
2.3 ANTI-AE

Having now seen that AE-licensers generate both an actuality inference and a modal inference, we might ask whether their semantics can be characterized as conjoining the two, that is, whether $\Diamond / \Box p$ asserts $p$ & $\Diamond / \Box p$. Evidence that this is not the case comes from constructions where AE-licensers are negated. Hacquard (2009), for example, notes that negated AE-licensers robustly suggest that their prejacent is false in the evaluation world, and in addition, that the modality is false as well. The first of these findings is shown for French and BP in (12-13).

(12) a. Alors qu’il (#n’a pas pu) (✓ ne pouvait pas) rendre visite à son ami, il lui a rendu visite  

while he (#NEG can.PVF) (✓ NE can.IMP) visit his friend he  


b. Les Alliés (#n’ont pas dû) (✓ ne devaient pas) bombarder Nagasaki  

the Allies (#NEG had.to.PVF) (✓ NEG had.to.IMP) bomb Nagasaki  

‘The allies did not have to bomb Nagasaki’

(13) a. Ele não (#pôde) (✓ podia) visitar seu amigo, mas ele visitou ele  

He NEG can. (#PFV) (✓ IMP) visit his friend but he visited him  

‘He was not allowed to visit his friend, but he visited him’

b. Ele não (#teve) (✓ tinha) que ir no dentista, mas ele foi  

He NEG had. (#PFV) (✓ IMP) to go to the dentist but he went  

‘He did not have to go to the dentist, but he went’

The versions of (12-13) with the (negated) AE-licensers are infelicitous. This would not be expected if their truth conditions were conjunctive, because the negations of those conjunctive conditions would be met if either conjunct (the actual claim or the modal claim) is false. In fact the sentences (with the AE-licensers) seem to entail the negation of actuality, hence their status.

It is worth noting that this pattern is not specific to cases where the AE-licenser appears under overt negation. In (14), for example, the BP particle só ‘only’ embeds $\Diamond / \Box$, but its exclusive component produces anti-AEs for the salient (negated) contextual alternatives. And (15) shows that the verb duvidar (‘doubt’) entails doubt about actuality when it embeds an AE-licenser, but not when it embeds a non-AE-licenser.

(14) a. Só a Lu pôde comer torta, #mas a Pri comeu torta também  

only Lu could-PVF eat cake but Pri ate cake also  

‘Only Lu was allowed to eat cake, but Pri ate cake also’

b. Só a Lu teve que fazer a prova, #mas a Pri fez a prova também  

only Lu had.to-PVF do the test but Pri did the test also  

‘Only Lu had to do the test, but Pri did the test also’

(15) a. Ele foi na festa, mas eu duvido que ele (#pôde) (✓ podia) ir  

He went to the party but I doubt that he could. (#PFV) (✓ IMP) go  

‘He went to the party, but I doubt that he was allowed to go’

b. Ele fez a prova, mas eu duvido que ele (#teve) (✓ tinha) que fazer  

He did the test but I doubt that he had.to. (#PFV) (✓ IMP) to do  

‘He did the test, but I doubt that he had to’

We learn so far, then, that $\neg \Diamond / \Box p$ entails $\neg p$. The finding is not trivial, because in the case of deontic modality the truth or falsity of the prejacent is independent of whether it is
permitted or required; \( \neg p \) cannot be derived from the negation of the modal claim. We will revisit this point briefly in Section 3.

Let us now turn to the second issue, of whether \( \neg \diamond/\lozenge p \) entails \( \neg \diamond/\lozenge p \). Here the facts are more subtle. We will discuss them briefly in the remainder of this section, but it should be noted from the start that this inference pattern, though crucial for any complete account of AEs, is not relevant to the main concerns of this paper. The AE-FC interaction, as we will see later, depends either on anti-AE (according to the SI-based view of FC) or on AE-modality (according to what I called the ‘semantic’ theories of FC). On neither kind of account is the status of modal inferences of negated AE-licensers relevant. The issue is brought up here in the interest of completeness.

Hacquard has claimed that, while negated possibility AE-licensers suggest the falsity of the relevant possibility claim, as (16a) does, the inference appears to be defeasible, as is shown by the felicity of the continuation in (16b).\(^6\)

(16) a. Darcy n’a pas pu s’enfuir
   ‘Darcy wasn’t able to escape.’

b. Darcy n’a pas pu s’enfuir. En fait, il en avait les moyens, mais il n’a même pas essayé
   ‘Darcy wasn’t able to escape. In fact, he had the means, but he didn’t even try.’

If Hacquard’s characterization is right, then the correct analysis of AEs must not only make \( \diamond/\lozenge p \) entail both \( p \) and \( \diamond/\lozenge p \)—the AE and AE-modality—but also make \( \neg \diamond/\lozenge p \) entail \( \neg p \) (the anti-AE) without entailing \( \neg \diamond/\lozenge p \). There is, however, reason to believe that (16b) is not due to any inherent weakness in the negative modal inference of \( \neg \diamond p \), but to a difference in the modal bases that are invoked by the expressions \( n’a pas pu \) (‘could.\( \text{pfv} \\) not’) and \( avait les moyens \) (‘had the means’).\(^7\) To see this, consider (17), where the AE-licenser from (16b) is replaced with the (present-tensed) non-AE-licenser \( ne peut pas \) (‘cannot’).

(17) Darcy ne peut pas s’enfuir. En fait, il en a les moyens, mais il n’essaye même pas
   ‘Darcy was not able to escape. In fact he had the means but did not even try’

(17) is consistent, and its consistency suggests that the negated possibility modal in its first half is not about Darcy’s means; if it were, the second half of the utterance would contradict the first. But if it is possible in (17) for \( ne peut pas \) to reference a different modal base from \( a les moyens \), there is no reason why the same can’t happen in (16b). So it may be true after all that negated AE-licensers do entail the negation of the relevant modality (in addition to

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6 See Hacquard 2009 Section 4.1.
7 I owe this observation to an anonymous JoS reviewer.
generating the anti-AE), and that the reason why (16b) is consistent has to do with a shift in modal base, in parallel to cases like (17).

The summary provided below is based on this conclusion. Negated AE-licensers have both a negative modal and a negative actual inference (the latter being the anti-AE). As I said, however, whether Hacquard is right that the inference from $\neg \Box / \Diamond p$ to $\neg \Box / \Diamond p$ is defeasible will not matter when we talk about theories of FC.

(18) $\neg \Box / \Diamond p \models \neg p$
     \hspace{1cm} (ANTI-AE)

\[\neg \Box / \Diamond p \models \neg \Box / \Diamond p\]

2.4 NO-FC

We now turn to our third and final property of AE-licensers: their failure to generate Free Choice inferences when they embed disjunctive prejacent. This, as is shown in the BP examples below, puts AE-licensers in sharp contrast to their non-AE-licensing forms, which do generate FC.\(^8\)

(19) Ele pôde/teve que aprender inglês ou francês. \#Então ele podia aprender inglês, e ele podia aprender francês.
    'He could/had-to learn English or French. Therefore he could learn English, and he could learn French'

\[\neg \Box / \Diamond (p \lor q) \not\models \Diamond p \land \Diamond q\]

(18) Ele podia/tinha que aprender inglês ou francês. √Então ele podia aprender inglês, e ele podia aprender francês
    'He could/had-to learn English or French. Therefore he had permission to learn English, and he had permission to learn French'

\[\Box / \Diamond (p \lor q) \models \Diamond p \land \Diamond q\]

A related test that shows a similar contrast comes from Truckenbrodt 2019. Truckenbrodt points out that and, but not or, can be used in what he calls a “list” (21a,b), unless the list follows a modal expression like can or has permission to (21c). The following examples are based on Truckenbrodt’s original (German) examples:

(21) a. Mary brought the following: an apple, a pear, and a banana.
    b. ??Mary brought the following: an apple, a pear, or a banana.
    c. Mary could / had permission to bring the following: an apple, a pear, or a banana.

And in BP and French we find a similar contrast, between non-AE-licensing modals and AE-licensing ones: the former can introduce disjunctive lists; the latter cannot:\(^9\)

(22) a. o João podia comer o seguinte: uma maçã, uma pera, ou uma banana.
    'João could eat the following: an apple, a pear, or a banana'

\[\Diamond / \Box (p \lor q) \models \Diamond p \land \Diamond q\]

To my knowledge, this property of AE-licensers has not been observed or discussed before. A related point was made by Rajesh Bhatt about the incompatibility of Hindi FCI items with PFV-marked ability modals, but not extended to disjunction (see Bhatt 2006: 172).

\(^9\) The French examples are modifications of Truckenbrodt’s test. They were suggested to me by Paloma Jeretič.
Before proceeding, some points of clarification are in order. First, in (19) the intended (and reportedly faulty) inference is from a PFV-marked premise to an IMP-marked conclusion. The reader may wonder why we do not compare the valid IMP-to-IMP discourse in (20) to a PFV-to-PFV analog, instead of the PFV-to-IMP instance in (19). The reason is that (19) tests whether the PFV premise licenses a conclusion of FC permission. If we were to change it to include a PFV-marked conclusion, the result would test whether the premise leads to a conclusion of actuality.

Second, the correlation that we are interested in is not between PFV-marking and the availability of FC. Rather, it is between AE-licensing and FC. This is important, because there are PFV-marked modal constructions that do not license AEs, like PFV-marked epistemic modals and expressions of the form “have permission to VP”. As it turns out, these non-AE-licensers do give rise to FC when they embed disjunctions. I show BP examples of the latter kind below — (26) uses the Truckenbrodt/Jeretić test introduced above:

(24) Ele teve permissão pra visitar a Ana, mas ele não visitou ela
He had.PFV permission to visit Ana but he NEG visited her
‘He had permission to visit João, but he didn’t visit him’  (no AE)

(25) Ele teve permissão pra visitar a Lu ou a Ana. Então ele teve permissão pra visitar a L, e ele teve permissão pra visitar a A.
He had.PFV permission to visit Lu or Ana Therefore he had.PFV permission to visit L and he had.PFV permission to visit A
‘He had permission to visit Lu or Ana. Therefore he had permission to visit L, and he had permission to visit A’  (✓ FC)

(26) a. ✓ o João teve permissão para comer o seguinte: uma maçã, uma pera, ou uma banana
João had.PFV permission to eat the following: an apple, a pear, or a banana
‘João had permission to eat the following: an apple, a pear, or a banana’

b. ✓ Deixa eu te falar o que o João teve permissão para comer: uma maçã, uma pera, ou uma banana
Let me you tell what João had.PFV permission to eat: an apple, a pear, or a banana
‘Let me tell you what João had permission to eat: an apple, a pear, or a banana’
Third, though $\Diamond/\Box$ do not license FC, they are compatible with FC scenarios. Sentence (27), taken from (19) above, can be uttered if the speaker knows that João had a choice between English/French, e.g. to get by in a place like Canada, but learned just one of the two. The same is true of the French (28).

(27) O João teve que aprender inglês ou francês
    João had-to.PFV learn English or French
(28) Il a dû apprendre l’anglais ou le français
    he had-to.PFV learn English or French

The compatibility of (27-28) with FC contexts shows that disjunction can take semantic scope below an AE-licenser. If it could not, a sentence of the form $\Diamond(p \lor q)$ would be synonymous with $\Diamond p \lor \Diamond q$, and would mean that $p$ (or $q$) was realized and required, which makes the construction false in scenarios where neither $p$ nor $q$ is by itself a necessity.\(^{10}\)

We now come to our final summary of the data: (i) AE-licensers generate AEs in addition to a modal inference; (ii) their negations generate anti-AEs, and negative modal inferences; and (iii) when they embed disjunctions, AE-licensers do not generate FC but are compatible with it.

(29) a. $\Diamond/\Box p \models p$, $\Diamond/\Box p$ (AE, AE-modality)
b. $\neg \Diamond/\Box p \models \neg p$  (anti-AE)
c. $\Diamond/\Box(p \lor q) \not\models FC$  (no-FC)

For reference, the behavior of non-AE-licensers in these respects is schematized below.

(30) a. $\Diamond/\Box p \not\models p$
b. $\neg \Diamond/\Box p \not\models \neg p$
c. $\Diamond/\Box(p \lor q) \models FC$

### 3 SIGNIFICANCE OF AE-MODALITY AND ANTI-AE FOR THEORIES OF AEs

In this section I briefly demonstrate the challenge posed by AE-modality and anti-AE to theories of AE-licensing. The theories I will consider are Bhatt’s (1999), Borgonovo & Cummins’s (2007), Hacquard’s (2009), and Homer’s (2011).

Bhatt treats ability verbs as implicative verbs (drawing on Karttunen 1971 and Karttunen & Peters 1979), and because implicative verbs are, at least on these accounts, assertorically equivalent to their prejacent, he predicts AEs as well as anti-AE.\(^{11}\) But as

\(^{10}\) This fact is made clearer when we compare two variants of the French soit-soit disjunction, which is said to overtly mark scope. In the scenario described above where either disjunct is possible but where one was realized, (1a) is true but (1b) is false. The disjunctive prejacent in (27) and (28) gives rise to a reading like (1a), not (1b).

(1) a. Il a dû apprendre soit l’anglais soit le français
    b. he had-to.PFV learn either English or French
    c. Soit il a dû apprendre l’anglais soit le français

\(^{11}\) This classic picture of implicative verbs was questioned recently in Baglini & Francez 2016.
Hacquard has pointed out, the account is not straightforwardly applicable to non-abilitative modals, putting in question its readiness in handling AE-MODALITY.12

Borgonovo & Cummins propose to derive AEs by narrowing the modal base of AE-licensers, abilitative and otherwise, to contain only the evaluation world. But this trivialization, though it predicts AEs and ANTI-AE, strips AE-licensers of their modality entirely, thus failing AE-MODALITY.

Hacquard predicts AE-MODALITY because she treats AE-licensers as bona fide modals. To derive AEs, she proposes a principle that she calls the Preservation of Event Descriptions (PED). The principle keeps event(uality) properties constant across worlds that are accessible to one another. So, if an eventuality $e$ in $w$ is a $p$-eventuality in some accessible world $w'$, then by the PED $e$ is a $p$-eventuality in $w$ itself. This generates AEs because, to Hacquard, PFV-marked modals introduce events in the evaluation world, and assigns them descriptions in accessible worlds. The PED guarantees that such events inherit whatever descriptions they take in accessible worlds. There is much more detail in Hacquard’s proposal than we can do justice to here, crucially including detail that prevents IMP-marked modals from licensing AEs. But to keep the discussion short we will focus only on the challenge that ANTI-AE presents to her account. Given that AE-licensers assert the existence of actual events, and assigns them descriptions in accessible worlds, it follows that when an AE-licenser is negated, the resulting semantics will deny the existence of such actual events. A negated form $\neg \Box p$ should be true in $w$ iff no event in $w$ is accessibly a $p$-event, i.e. an event of $p$ in any accessible worlds from $w$. If the accessibility relation is reflexive, as is arguably the case for ablitative/circumstantial modals, anti-AEs result straightforwardly; if there are no $p$-events in any of the worlds accessible from $w$, and if $w$ is itself one of those accessible worlds, then there will be no $p$-events in $w$ (see Hacquard 2009, Section 4.1). But this ploy will not generate anti-AEs when a deontic AE-licenser is negated, because deontic accessibility is not reflexive. In this case, $\neg \Box p$ will deny the existence of events that are (deontically) accessibly-$p$ events, but this does not preclude the existence of actual $p$-events; lack of permission/obligation does not entail lack of actuality.13

Finally, Homer (2011) builds on findings from Mari & Martin 2007 and Bary 2009 and proposes that AE-licensing results from a mechanism of aspect-shift. His implementation makes use of a covert shifting operator $ACT$, which co-occurs with modals (and other stative verbs) in certain conditions, and generates a derived predicate that conjoins the modal VP with its prejacent. An entry for $ACT$, simplified from Homer, is shown in (31).14

$$[ACT \ [\Diamond \ [VP]]] = [\lambda e . \ [[VP]](e) \ & \ \exists e' (\tau(e) \subseteq \tau(e') \ & \ \Diamond ([[VP]](e')))$$

12 A more detailed critique of Bhatt’s account is beyond the scope of this paper. Interested readers are referred to Hacquard 2009 and Hacquard 2014.

13 The issue is more complicated than this, and ultimately rests on whether one assumes the domain of events to be constant across worlds. To Hacquard the assumption has to be that the domain is not constant, so that events are allowed to exist in some worlds without existing in others. This is the crucial detail that stops AEs from arising for IMP-marked modals. For reasons of space we cannot elaborate on this point (see Hacquard 2009 Section 3.2.2). We simply note that, with this assumption in place, it becomes possible for $\neg \Box p$ to hold in a world, and for there to simultaneously be a $p$-event in that same world. This is why the proposal fails ANTI-AE.

14 In Homer’s original (compositional) entry, $ACT$ is assumed to accompany an unpronounced VP-”pronoun”, which (in AE examples) is coindexed with the embedded VP. $ACT$ generates the AE by conjoining the pronoun with the modal VP.
By its definition, (31) generates both the AE and the modal inference, but because of its conjunctive truth conditions, it is clear that the entry cannot account for ANTI-AE. It should be noted, however, that Homer need not commit to the specific conjunctive conditions in (31) in his attempt to relate AE-licensing to aspect shift. A revision that would capture both AEs and anti-AEs is the following:

(32) \[ \text{ACT}[\Diamond \text{VP}] = [\lambda e : [\text{VP}](e) \leftrightarrow \exists e' (\tau(e) \subseteq \tau(e') \& \Diamond([\text{VP}](e'))) \& [\text{VP}](e)] \]

Here, unlike in (31), ACT in effect asserts the (non-modal) VP, but presupposes a biconditional connection between that VP and the relevant modality: \([\text{ACT}[\Diamond \text{VP}]]\) is defined for an eventuality \(e\) only if \(e\)'s satisfaction of \([\text{VP}]\) is tied to the existence of another contemporaneous eventuality, one that satisfies \([\text{VP}]\) in some/all accessible worlds, depending on the force/flavor of the given modal. Of the events in its domain, \([\text{ACT}[\Diamond \text{VP}]]\) maps to True those events that satisfy \([\text{VP}]\), and to False those events that do not. It follows from (32) that both the AE and the modality of its licenser will be entailed when the licenser is asserted, and that their negations will be entailed when the AE-licenser appears under negation.\(^{15}\) This seems to work, but its plausibility qua a description of an aspect-shift mechanism must be left to future work.

Having demonstrated the challenge presented by AE-MODALITY and ANTI-AE to theories of AE-licensing, we now consider the relevance of the two desiderata to theories of FC disjunction, crucially given the NO-FC property of AE-licensers.

4 AEs AND FREE CHOICE DISJUNCTIONS

The problem of free-choice disjunction is well known. Sentences where a possibility modal embeds a disjunction are intuitively understood to imply the relevant possibility for each disjunct.

(33) John is allowed to eat cake or ice cream

Inference: John is allowed to eat cake and John is allowed to eat ice cream

The FC inference is surprising if we assume a boolean definition of disjunction, and a representation of possibility as existential quantification over accessible worlds. On such assumptions we expect (33), more generally \(\Diamond(p \lor q)\), to be true in a scenario where John is allowed to eat cake but not ice cream \((\Diamond p \land \neg \Diamond q)\), because \(\Diamond p\) alone is sufficient to make the premise \(\Diamond(p \lor q)\) true. Why, then, is the modality felt to be distributed among the disjuncts?

One kind of answer derives FC as a scalar implicature. Another derives it from the semantic composition of disjunction and modals, using a non-boolean semantics of disjunction, and a non-existential representation of possibility. We will discuss these two kinds of theories in light of the NO-FC property of AE-licensers, given also AE-MODALITY and ANTI-AE.

4.1 FC as a scalar implicature

In this section I show with minimal detail how FC is derived as an SI, and show that the relevant mechanisms are predicted not to produce FC with AE-licensing modals. This is

\(^{15}\) The case of negation is a little complicated, since it requires additional assumptions about how presuppositions project across (negated) existential quantification. On this, see (a.o.) Heim 1983, Beaver 2001, Schlenker 2008, George 2008, Charlow 2009, Fox 2012, and Sudo 2012.
done in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, respectively. In Section 4.1.3 I discuss two assumptions that the prediction depends on.

To be concrete, I will adopt the perspectives of Alonso-Ovalle (2005) and Klinedinst (2007) when dealing with necessity modals, and Fox (2007) when dealing with possibility modals. The first two views derive FC by exhaustifying \( \Box (p \lor q) \) relative to the alternatives \( \{ \Box p, \Box q, \Box (p \land q) \} \); the third view derives FC from recursively exhaustifying \( \Diamond (p \lor q) \), that is, from exhaustifying Exh(\( \Diamond (p \lor q) \)) relative to the alternatives \{Exh(\( \Diamond p \)), Exh(\( \Diamond q \)), Exh(\( \Diamond (p \land q) \))\}.

These accounts, as I will now show, predict the absence of FC if the form \( \Diamond (p \lor q) \) is exhaustified given the alternatives \( \{ \Box p, \Box q, \Box (p \land q) \} \), and if Exh(\( \Diamond (p \lor q) \)) is exhaustified given \{Exh(\( \Diamond p \)), Exh(\( \Diamond q \)), Exh(\( \Diamond (p \land q) \))\}. The reasons for this are explained in more detail below, but in a nutshell they are as follows. In the case of \( \Box (p \lor q) \), negating the alternatives \( \Box p \) and \( \Box q \) would entail \( \neg p \) and \( \neg q \) (by ANTI-AE), and would therefore contradict the disjunctive AE \( (p \lor q) \) of the utterance itself. This makes the alternatives non-excludable, and consequently keeps them from participating in generating FC, in contrast to their analogs in the case of \( \Box (p \land q) \). For \( \Diamond (p \lor q) \), recursive exhaustification does not generate the inferences \( \Diamond p \) and \( \Diamond q \) — again in contrast to the case of \( \Box (p \lor q) \) where it generates \( \Diamond p \), \( \Diamond q \) — because the AE of \( \Diamond p \), \( \Diamond q \) would jointly entail the conjunction \( p \land q \), and would therefore contradict the exclusive inference of the embedded exhaustification of \( \Diamond (p \lor q) \). Here too, then, the alternatives paralleling those of non-AE-licensors are made inactive by their non-excludability, and prevented from producing FC, as desired.

In the next two sections I provide a more detailed description of SI-accounts of FC, and of how they lead to this prediction.

4.1.1 FC by exhaustification and recursive exhaustification Theories that derive FC as an SI standardly include at least these two assumptions:

A.1 A(n embedded) disjunction \( p \lor q \) has its disjuncts \( p, q \) and their conjunction \( p \land q \) as alternatives;\(^{17}\)

A.2 SI-calculation targets only alternatives whose participation does not lead to inconsistency.\(^ {18}\)

A1 produces FC straightforwardly in the case of \( \Box (p \lor q) \): replacing \( (p \lor q) \) with \( p, q \) gives us the alternatives \( \Box p \) and \( \Box q \), and from these we derive the SIs \( \neg \Box p \) and \( \neg \Box q \), which are equivalent to \( \neg \Diamond p \) and \( \neg \Diamond q \), respectively. These two inferences, together with the utterance, entail \( \Diamond p \) and \( \Diamond q \). (Note that the SI \( \neg \Box (p \land q) \) adds nothing in this case.)

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16 I do not discuss pragmatic approaches to the problem of FC, e.g. Eckardt 2007 and Schulz 2007.
17 Sauerland 2004 and many since.
18 A2 is vague. It can be replaced with Fox’s (2007) condition of Innocent Excludability: an alternative \( S’ \) is innocently-excludable given a sentence \( S \) and a set of alternatives \( A \) iff, for any sub-selection of alternatives from \( A \) whose negations are jointly consistent with \( S \), adding the negation of \( S’ \) does not lead to inconsistency. Formally:

\[
(1) \quad S’ \text{ is innocently-excludable given } S \text{ and set of alternatives } A \text{ iff } \\
\forall A’(A’ \subseteq A \land A’ \land S \perp \perp \rightarrow A’ \land S \land \neg S’ \perp \perp) \\
\text{where for any set } B, B^\perp = \bigwedge \{\neg \psi : \psi \in B\}
\]

A related idea can be found in Sauerland’s (2004) condition on promoting Primary Implicatures to Secondary ones.
A2 keeps the SI-mechanism from targeting the alternatives \( p, q \) in the case of \( p \lor q \), since the SIs that would otherwise result, \( \neg p \) and \( \neg q \), would contradict the disjunction. The only predicted SI in the case of \( p \lor q \) is the exclusive inference \( \neg(p \land q) \). In Section 4.1.2 we will see a similar outcome in the case of the AE-licensing \( \Box(p \lor q) \).

Let us turn to the case of \( \Diamond(p \lor q) \). Here the alternatives \( \Diamond p, \Diamond q \) have falsity conditions that jointly contradict \( \Diamond(p \lor q) \), so by A2 they cannot participate in calculating its SIs. The conjunctive alternative \( \Diamond(p \land q) \) can participate, however, and as a result we get only the exclusive inference \( \neg \Diamond(p \land q) \). The way to derive FC, according to Fox (2007), is to apply exhaustification recursively.\(^{19}\) Assume a pre-exhaustified \( \Diamond(p \lor q) \), hereafter Exh\((\Diamond(p \lor q)) \). By A1, this pre-exhaustified form has Exh\((\Diamond p) \) and Exh\((\Diamond q) \) as its alternatives, in addition to the conjunctive Exh\((\Diamond(p \land q)) \) — the latter plays no role. The alternative Exh\((\Diamond p) \) says that \( p \) is possible but not \( q \), and the alternative Exh\((\Diamond q) \) says that \( q \) is possible but not \( p \). The falsity of these two alternatives requires, respectively, that if \( p \) is possible then so is \( q \), and if \( q \) is possible then so is \( p \). Therefore, exhaustifying Exh\((\Diamond(p \lor q)) \) with respect to Exh\((\Diamond p) \) and Exh\((\Diamond q) \) will generate the joint inference that if one of \( p, q \) is possible, then so is the other: \( \Diamond p \leftrightarrow \Diamond q \). This inference, together with the literal meaning of \( \Diamond(p \lor q) \), produces \( \Diamond p, \Diamond q \), i.e. FC.\(^{20}\)

In principle nothing prevents exhaustification from applying recursively to unembedded disjunctions also. However, A1 and A2 guarantee that no additional (and unwanted) inferences follow in this case. Take the alternatives Exh\((p) \) and Exh\((q) \) to the pre-exhaustified Exh\((p \lor q) \). These alternatives mean, respectively, \( p \& \neg q \) and \( q \& \neg p \). The SIs that would result from negating them would jointly say \( p \leftrightarrow q \). But this contradicts the exclusive disjunctive meaning of Exh\((p \lor q) \). (A1 plays a key role here: the exclusive meaning of Exh\((p \lor q) \) requires that the conjunctive \( p \land q \) be an alternative to \( p \lor q \).) Because of this, Exh\((p) \) and Exh\((q) \) are blocked from participating in SI-generation. It follows that, unlike in the case of \( \Diamond(p \lor q) \), recursive exhaustification of \( p \lor q \) does not generate additional inferences. In Section 4.1.2 we will see a similar outcome in the case of the AE-licensing \( \Diamond(p \lor q) \).

### 4.1.2 No-fc under the Scalar Implicature view of FC

Now consider the AE-licensing construction \( \Box(p \lor q) \). By A1 above, we get the alternatives \( \Box p, \Box q, \Box(p \land q) \), but by A2, the alternatives \( \Box p \) and \( \Box q \) are kept out of SI-generation. This is because, by ANTI-AE, the falsity of the two alternatives entails \( \neg p, \neg q \), and this would conflict with the AE of the sentence \( \Box(p \lor q) \). Nothing is left that can generate FC.

In the case of \( \Diamond(p \lor q) \) recursive exhaustification also falls short of producing FC. The pre-exhaustified form Exh\((\Diamond(p \lor q)) \) has both the inference \( \Diamond(p \lor q) \) and the exclusive inference \( \neg \Diamond(p \land q) \). The first entails the AE \( (p \lor q) \), and the second entails the anti-AE \( \neg(p \land q) \). By A1, this pre-exhaustified form has the alternatives {Exh\((\Diamond p) \), Exh\((\Diamond q) \), Exh\((\Diamond(p \land q)) \). It can now be shown that, because of its exclusive inference, exhaustifying the form further will not target the alternatives Exh\((\Diamond p) \) and Exh\((\Diamond q) \), because if it did, a contradiction

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19 This builds on insights from Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002. See Bar-Lev & Fox 2017 for a recent proposal that does not involve iteration of Exh.

20 Klinedinst (2007) derives FC for possibility modals using the same mechanism as for necessity modals. He holds the view that both are universal in their force, but differ in the domain of worlds they quantify over (see also Rullmann et al. 2008 for related findings from the Salish language St’át’îmctcets). As far as I can see, Klinedinst’s account of FC is compatible with the points made in this paper.
would follow: $\neg \text{Exh}(\Diamond p)$ means $\Diamond p \rightarrow \Diamond q$, and $\neg \text{Exh}(\Diamond q)$ means $\Diamond q \rightarrow \Diamond p$. But this means that either $\Diamond p$ and $\Diamond q$ are both false, or they are both true. If they are false, then by anti-AE it follows that $p$ and $q$ are false, which conflicts with the AE $(p \lor q)$; if they are true, then by their AEs it follows that $p$ and $q$ are true, which conflicts with the exclusive inference of $\text{Exh}(\Diamond(p \lor q))$. Given these conflicts, A2 blocks $\text{Exh}(\Diamond p)$ and $\text{Exh}(\Diamond q)$ from participating in SI-generation, and no other alternatives remain that can generate FC.

Thus, given some additional assumptions that we turn to below, the result is that the SI-view of FC predicts the no-FC property of AE-licensers, as long as it is combined with a theory of AE-licensing that satisfies the anti-AE desideratum. This is because FC, on the SI-view, results not from the literal semantics of the modal, nor that of disjunction, but from the negation (or exclusion) of the suitable formal alternatives in conjunction with the inferences of the disjunctive utterance. The absence of such alternatives in the cases of $\Box(p \lor q)$ and $\Diamond(p \lor q)$ is the reason why AE-licensing obviates FC.

4.1.3 Auxiliary assumptions in obviating FC  The result reported in the last section hinges on at least two nontrivial assumptions. My goal in this section is to identify them, and to discuss their role and plausibility.

The first assumption has to do with the formal alternatives to disjunction-embedding AE-constructions, like $\Box(p \lor q)$. (The points made in this section apply equally to $\Diamond(p \lor q)$.)

The alternatives to $\Box(p \lor q)$ were assumed above to be $\{\Box p, \Box q, \Box(p \land q)\}$, i.e. the results of replacing the disjunctive prejacent with its disjuncts and with their conjunction. We did not consider alternatives where, in addition, $\Box$ is replaced with its non-AE-licensing counterpart $\forall$. This would add $\forall p$, $\forall q$, and $\forall(p \land q)$ to the set. But with this expansion, FC will again be incorrectly predicted; the reader may verify that both $\forall p$ and $\forall q$ can be targeted by SI-generation without leading to inconsistency, and will produce the FC inference: By AE-modality, $\Box(p \lor q)$ entails $\Box(p \lor q)$, and together with the implicatures $\neg \Box p, \neg \Box q$, it follows that $\Diamond p$ and $\Diamond q$.

To prevent this outcome, we need to keep $\forall p, \forall q$ out of the set of formal alternatives to $\Box(p \lor q)$. There are two technical ways of achieving this. The first is to keep $\forall$ from being an alternative to $\Box$, that is, to assume that AE-licensers do not have non-AE-licensing constructions as scalemates (in the sense of Horn 1972). I do not think this is right, at the very least because existential (deontic) AE-licensers, like the BP $\text{pôde}$ and the French $\text{a pu}$, imply that their prejacent is not required. This could not be derived if $\Diamond$ did not have the non-AE-licensing $\Box$ as a formal alternative — note that the alternative $\Box$ would not help, because its anti-AE would contradict the AE of $\Diamond$. The second way is to constrain the alternative-generation mechanism so that only one subpart of the given construction is replaced at a time. Take for example the algorithm in Katzir 2007, where alternatives result from substitutions and/or structural simplification of the prejacent. If the algorithm is constrained, so that only one operation is permitted in generating any given alternative, we will allow $\Box p$ and $\Box q$, because these result from replacing the disjunction in $\Box(p \lor q)$ with its disjuncts, but we will block $\forall p$ and $\forall q$, because these require two substitutions: $\forall$ must be replaced with $\forall$, and $(p \lor q)$ must be replaced with $p/q$. I think this possibility receives some independent support from a closely related case. Consider $\Diamond(p \land q)$, e.g. John is allowed to talk to Mary and Sue. In such cases there does not seem to be an implicature that $\neg \Box p$, e.g. John is not required to talk to Mary. If this is right, it means that the alternative $\forall p$ is not generated for $\Diamond(p \land q)$, despite the fact that $\forall$ elsewhere serves as an alternative to $\Diamond$, and that conjuncts typically serve as alternatives to the conjunction they appear in.
The absence of $\Box p$ as an alternative to $\Diamond (p \lor q)$ would follow if alternative generation is constrained in the way described above.\footnote{Similarly, \textit{some of our students know Mary and Sue} does not implicate \textit{not all of our students know Mary}. The restriction entertained here relates to a problem noticed by \textcite{Romoli(2013)}. The problem concerns the implicatures of sentences like \textit{John is not required to come}. If alternatives can be generated by multiple replacement/simplification operations, then we expect the alternatives in this case to include \textit{John is not allowed to come} and also \textit{John is allowed to come}. But negating both alternatives is contradictory, so by A2 they are predicted to be kept out of SI-generation. To capture intuitions, we want only the former to belong to the alternative set. The unwanted alternative may be kept out on the same grounds as $\Box p$ and $\Box q$ above, since it results from simultaneous simplification of, and substitution into, the original sentence.}

The second necessary assumption relates to the internal structure of AE-licensing constructions. Recall that Hacquard and Homer derive AEs from the composition of a (non-AE-licensing) modal item with some external element ($\text{PFV}$ for Hacquard, and $\text{ACT}$ for Homer). The relevant structures on both views have the specific property that a non-AE-licensing modal item forms a syntactic unit with the prejacent, which in turn composes with the piece that generates the AE (either $\text{PFV}$ or $\text{ACT}$). Any view that adopts a similar structural assumption, where a non-AE-licenser and the prejacent form a constituent on their own, will allow exhaustification to apply to that constituent before it is combined with the remaining ingredients. In the case of a disjunctive prejacent (as in (34)), this runs the risk of generating the undesirable FC inference.

\begin{equation}
(34) \quad [\text{PFV/ACT}/ \cdots ([\text{Exh}] [\Box (p \lor q)])]
\end{equation}

Thus, the predicted obviation of FC, on SI theories, holds only if configurations like (34) are blocked. A possibility that immediately suggests itself is that AE-licensing auxiliaries form morphosyntactic units of their own, that is, units consisting of the modal root/stem and the AE-generating element (whatever it may be) without the prejacent. In that case, there would be no constituent for exhaustification to derive FC from in the case of disjunctive prejacent.

The finding is therefore this: any theory of AEs that satisfies \textit{anti-AE} is predicted to also satisfy \textit{no-FC} under the SI-view of Free Choice inferences, as long as (i) constructions of the form $\Box (p \lor q)/\Diamond (p \lor q)$ are assumed not to have $\Box p, \Box q/\Diamond p, \Diamond q$ as formal alternatives, and (ii) AE-licensing modals are assumed to make their own morphosyntactic units. To the extent that (i) and (ii) can be independently motivated, this result lends tentative support to the view of FC inferences as SIs.

4.2 FC as semantic distribution of the disjuncts

By ‘semantic distribution of disjuncts’ I intend a property, common to a number theories of FC, by which the semantics of modals and the semantics of disjunction together produce truth conditions that ‘distribute’ the individual disjuncts across the given modal base. The question raised in this section is whether these accounts predict \textit{no-FC}, considering \textit{AE-modality} and the finding that AE-licensers can take disjunctive prejacent.

An example of this class of theories, which I will take to be representative, is \textcite{Aloni(2007)}. For reasons of space, I will minimize discussion of the technical details of the account and keep to the essentials. A key assumption in Aloni is that a disjunctive expression
[A or B] corresponds to two semantic representations, which in unembedded cases have identical satisfaction conditions. One representation is boolean, essentially the union of the propositional denotations of the disjuncts. The other quantifies existentially over the disjuncts, amounting to a satisfaction condition that requires at least one of them to hold in the evaluation world. This is similar to assigning disjunctions non-singleton, focus-like denotations, and making available an interpretive mechanism that existentially closes those denotations.

Another key assumption in Aloni’s proposal is that possibility modals quantify universally over the retrievable alternatives of the prejacent, and anchors each of them in at least one accessible world. A construction of the form [◊(A or B)] is thus ambiguous, owing to the two possible representations of [A or B]: on the boolean representation, the satisfaction conditions of [◊(A or B)] require at least one accessible world to verify the sole disjunctive alternative; on the non-boolean representation, the conditions require at least one world to verify A, and at least one world to verify B. This is FC.

Consider now the case of [◊(A or B)]. From ae-modality, we expect the inference to [◊(A or B)] to follow, and if the disjunctive prejacent in the premise is given a non-boolean representation, then FC should follow, contrary to no-fc. Note that there is nothing inconsistent about the predicted (but unattested) meaning here: the sentence would say that one of A/B happened (the AE), but that each was permitted/possible (FC via ae-modality).23

One way of obviating this outcome is to assume that AE-licensers encode a ‘flattening’ mechanism, so that the inferences they generate (AEs and ae-modality) are never based directly on their prejacent, but on the grand-union—i.e. flattening—of the prejacent’s alternatives.24 If this is assumed, then in the case of [◊(A or B)] the content of the AE would be the boolean disjunction A or B, and the modal inference (thanks to flattening) would not have the alternatives that the modal needs to generate FC. I leave it to future work to test the predictions of this move.

5 CONCLUSION AND REMAINING ISSUES

This paper highlighted three properties of AE-licensers: ae-modality, anti-ae, and no-fc. The first two were used to evaluate four accounts of AE-licensing, while the third was used to evaluate two kinds of theories of FC disjunction. It was shown that any theory of AE-licensing that captures anti-ae is predicted to capture no-fc on views of FC as a scalar implicature. This finding, however, was shown to depend on necessary auxiliary assumptions about (a) the alternatives to AE-licensers, and (b) the structural relation

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23 The issue is relevant not just to Aloni’s account, but to any view where FC is seen as a consequence of the semantic interaction between modality and disjunction. In Aher 2012, for example, the assertion ‘that φ is permitted’ is taken to be equivalent to the conditional assertion that ‘if φ then no violation’ (See also van Rooij 2006). On such an account, FC inferences follow simply from the logic inherent to the conditional assertion: from the premise that ‘if p ∨ q, then no violation’ it follows that ‘if p, then no violation’, and that ‘if q, then no violation’. If these conditional truth conditions constitute the semantics of permission, and if permission follows from the semantics of deontic AE-licensers, we predict that FC follow from statements of the form ◊(p ∨ q), again incorrectly.

24 In inquisitive semantics, flattening is encoded in the semantics of negation. See e.g. Ciardelli et al. 2017.
between AE-licensers and their prejacent. We then showed that on other “semantic”
theories of FC, AE-modality is predicted to incorrectly lead to FC, a point that was
illustrated using Aloni’s (2007) analysis of FC-disjunctions. However it was also shown
that the problem can be bypassed, within views like Aloni’s, if AE-licensers are assumed to
operate on flattened construals of their prejacent.

To my knowledge there is no prior discussion in the literature of the interaction between
AE-licensing and FC-licensing. The results reported in this paper—tentative though they are,
given that neither AEs nor FC is fully understood—constitute the first attempt to study the
two phenomena together. Doing this, as I intended to show, provides new ways of testing
the predictions of the various theories of FC, and helps identify future objectives both for
theories of FC as well as theories of AE-licensing.

5.1 Two predictions for future work

Before closing, I want to note two further predictions made by the SI-account of FC that I
have yet to confirm or disconfirm. The first has to do with negated universal modals that
embed conjunctive prejacent. Fox (2007) has pointed out that FC is not limited to cases
where an existential modal embeds a disjunction (◊(p ∨ q)), but appears to arise also when a
negated universal embeds a conjunction (¬◇(p ∧ q)). For example, (35a) intuitively licenses
the inferences in (35b,c), namely that Mary does not need to talk to Bill, and does not need
to talk to Sue:

(35) a. Mary does not need to talk to Bill and to Sue  ¬◇(p ∧ q) = ◇(¬p ∨ ¬q)
    b. ¬◊ Mary does not need to talk to Bill  ¬◇p = ◇(¬p)
    c. ¬◊ Mary does not need to talk to Sue  ¬◇q = ◇(¬q)

On Fox’s view, the derivation of these inferences as implicatures parallels the derivation
of FC from ◇(p ∨ q). The connection becomes clearer when we note the similarity in
propositional content: (35a) is equivalent to a permission statement with a (semantically)
disjunctive prejacent, and its alternatives, (35b,c), are each equivalent to a permission
statement about one of the “disjuncts” of that prejacent (see right margins above). Thus,
given the logical relation between the form in (35a) and its alternatives, we expect recursive
exhaustification to produce FC from (35a) in the same way that it does for ◇(p ∨ q).25
The derivation is as follows: single exhaustification of ¬◇(p ∧ q) produces the implicature
¬¬◇(p ∨ q), i.e. ◇(p ∨ q). This inference, which we may call the embedded implicature,
is not as important in this case as it is when we look at AE-licensers (below). Now,
exhaustification of the pre-exhaustified form Exh¬◇(p ∧ q) produces the implicatures
¬Exh¬◇p and ¬Exh¬◇q. These amount to the inferences (¬◇p → ¬◇q) and (¬◇q → ¬◇p), which jointly say that if one of p, q is not required, then neither is the other:
(¬◇p ↔ ¬◇q). This inference is consistent with the pre-exhaustified Exh¬◇(p ∧ q), but
only if ¬◇p is true, and ¬◇q is true, that is, if neither p nor q is required.26 These are the
inferences in (35b,c) above.

25 It must be emphasized that this derivation does not require substituting ◇ with •, and therefore does
not violate the condition on alternativehood considered in Section 4.1.3. Thanks to Nathan Klinedinst
for asking about this.
26 If ¬◇p and ¬◇q were both false, the literal meaning of the original sentence ¬◇(p ∧ q) couldn’t
possibly be true.
What about cases of the form $\neg \Box (p \land q)$, where the negated universal modal is an AE-licenser? Here the prediction changes, once again in a way that parallels the case of $\Diamond (p \lor q)$. The key detail has to do with the embedded implicature mentioned above. Single exhaustification of $\neg \Box (p \land q)$ produces the inference $\neg \neg \Box (p \lor q)$, assuming that the disjunctive form is a relevant alternative. If it is, and if this instance of double-negation leads with sufficient strength to the conclusion that $\Box (p \lor q)$, and to the AE $(p \lor q)$, we predict no further inferences to result from recursive exhaustification; the AE $(p \lor q)$ of the embedded implicature is not consistent with the simultaneous falsity of $\Box p$ and $\Box q$, because the falsity of these alternatives entails $\neg p \land \neg q$. It follows that the form $\neg \Box (p \land q)$, unlike $\Box (p \land q)$, will not be predicted to imply $\neg \Box p$ and $\neg \Box q$.

I have so far found it difficult to test this prediction. The French/BP speakers that I consulted seem to agree that sentences of this form are hard to process. To some speakers of French, $n'a$ pas dû strongly favors an epistemic reading, which makes the examples irrelevant for our purposes. To other speakers, both of French and of BP, the deontic reading is available, but there are still differences among the speakers. Some find the sentences to not give rise to FC, as predicted. Others get the inferences that neither of the conjuncts was realized. For example, the French sentence in (36) implies that the subject did not take either English or German, and similarly, the BP sentence in (37) suggests that the subject did not make food, and did not clean the house.27

(36) Quand il était au lycée, il n'a pas dû prendre anglais et allemand

When he was in high school, he NEG have.to.PFV take English and German

‘When he was in high school, he did not have to take English and German’

(37) Ele não teve que fazer comida e limpar a casa

He NEG had.to-PFV make food and clean the house

‘He did not have to make food and clean the house’

I do not know what explains the conjunctive anti-AEs here. Perhaps the embedded implicature $\neg \neg \Box (p \lor q)$ does not introduce an AE, and therefore does not block further exhaustification. If the AE $(p \lor q)$ is indeed absent, recursive exhaustification would produce the inferences $\neg \Box p$ and $\neg \Box q$ after all, which in e.g. (37) would license the inferences that the subject did not make food, did not clean the house, and did not have to make food, and did not have to clean the house. I leave closer study of these cases to future work.

The second note I want to make is that no-FC, according to the implicature view, depends crucially on the anti-AEs that come with participation in implicature calculation. It is the anti-AE that accompanies the falsity of $\Box p$ and $\Box q$ that prevents the two alternatives from being innocently excludable, and hence from contributing to the implicatures of the form $\Box (p \lor q)$ and leading to FC. Anti-AEs play the same role in the case of $\Diamond (p \lor q)$ too: the anti-AE of the embedded implicature $\neg \Diamond (p \land q)$ blocks the alternatives Exh($\Diamond p$) and Exh($\Diamond q$) from adding the inferences that their counterparts, Exh($\Diamond p$) and Exh($\Diamond q$), add in the case of $\Diamond (p \lor q)$. The prediction, then, is that if we find an AE-licenser modal whose falsity/negation does not give rise to anti-AEs, we expect that modal to license FC inferences when it embeds a disjunctive prejcaent. I do not know of any AE-licensing modal that does not also license anti-AEs when negated, so I leave this prediction to future work also.

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